Evaluation of Affidavits and Inssuance of Search Warrants:  A Practical Guide for Federal Magistrates by Burnett, Arthur L.
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 64 | Issue 3 Article 2
1974
Evaluation of Affidavits and Inssuance of Search
Warrants: A Practical Guide for Federal Magistrates
Arthur L. Burnett
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
This Criminal Law is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Arthur L. Burnett, Evaluation of Affidavits and Inssuance of Search Warrants: A Practical Guide for Federal Magistrates, 64 J. Crim. L.
& Criminology 270 (1973)
THE JOURNAL OF CmrniAL LAw & CamINoLoGY
Copyright 0 1973 by Northwestern University School of Law
Vol. 64, No. 3
Printed in U.S.A.
EVALUATION OF AFFIDAVITS AND INSSUANCE OF SEARCH WARRANTS:
A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR FEDERAL MAGISTRATES
ARTHUR L. BURNETT*
INTRODUCTION
While the critical role played by magistrates in
securing the liberties granted by the fourth amend-
ment has long been recognized,1 several recent
decisions by the United States Supreme Court
have reemphasized that wherever possible govern-
ment searches and seizures must be conducted
only after sanction by a neutral and detached
magistrate. For example, in United States v.
United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Michigan,2 which dealt with the constitutionality
of warrantless wiretaps of alleged subversive
activities, Mr. Justice Powell referred to Lord
Mansfield's observations of some two centuries
ago:
It is not fit that the receiving or judging of infor-
mation ought to be left to the discretion of the offi-
cer. The magistrate ought to judge, and should give
certain directions to the officer.2
Mr. Justice Powell concluded:
Lord Mansfield's formulation touches the very
heart of the Fourth Amendment directive: that,
where practical, a government search and seizure
should represent both the efforts of the officer to
gather evidence of wrongful acts and the judgment
of the magistrate that the collected evidence is
sufficient to justify invasion of a citizen's private
premises or conversation. Inherent in the concept
of a warrant is its issuance by a 'neutral and de-
tached magistrate'.
4
* United States Magistrate, United States District
Court, Washington, D.C. B.A., Howard University;
L.L.B., New York University School of Law, 1958.
'See, e.g. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10,
13-14 (1948, where Mr. Justice Jackson noted:
The point of the fourth amendment, which is not
often grasped by zealous officers, is not that it
denies law enforcement officers the support of the
usual inferences which reasonable men draw from
the evidence. Its protection consists in requiring
that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and
detached magistrate instead of being judged by
the officer engaged in the often competitive enter-
prise of ferreting out crime.
2407 U.S. 297 (1972).
3 Id. at 316, quoting Leach v. Three of the King's
Messengers, 19 How. St. Tr. 1001, 1027 (1765).
4 407 U.S. at 316. See also Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire, 403 U.S. 443, 453 (1971).
On the same day that the decision in the wiretap
case was announced, the Court also defined the
concept of a neutral and detached magistrate in
Shadwick v. City of Tampa:5
... [A]n issuing magistrate must meet two tests. He
must be neutral and detached, and he must be
capable of determining whether probable cause
exists for the requested arrest or search.
6
The opinion by Mr. Justice Powell further suggests
at least one hallmark of the "neutral and detached"
magistrate:
Whatever else neutrality and detachment might
entail, it is clear that it requires severence and dis-
engagement from activities of law enforcement.
There has been no showing whatever here of par-
tiality, or affiliation of these clerks with prosecutors
or police. The record shows no connection with any
law enforcement activity or authority which would
distort the independent judgment the Fourth
Amendment requires.
7
Thus, while magistrates must recognize and
protect legitimate law enforcement objectives,
they must also remain on guard against becoming
a participant in the overzealous efforts of law
enforcement officers. The purpose of this article
is to focus on certain problems which face federal
magistrates today, and to offer some suggestions
to aid them in the proper exercise of their critical
function.
GROUNDS FOR ISSUING A SEARCH WARRANT:
THE BALANCING OF PROBABILITIES
Although the information submitted to a magis-
trate must set forth sufficient grounds for the
issuance of a search warrant, factual statements in
an affidavit need not establish proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, nor even by a preponderance of
the evidence. What is required is a balancing of
s 407 U.S. 345 (1972). The case upheld the consti-
tutionality of municipal court clerks issuing arrest
warrants for petty offenses under Tampa, Florida
municipal ordinances.
6 Id. at 350.
7 Id. at 350-51.
SEARCH WARRANTS
the probabilities.3 Employing a mathematical
concept, the magistrate must be at least fifty-one
percent satisfied after reading the affidavit and
considering everyday factual experiences on which
reasonable and prudent men act, that the factual
assertions justify the conclusion that a search of
the premises will uncover the items sought.9
For the purposes of balancing these probabilities,
the United States Supreme Court has established
certain rules which magistrates are required to
follow when evaluating the information contained
within: an affidavit. If an afflant comes before a
magistrate with information based on his own
observations, the Court has clearly indicated
s United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 579n.1 (1971).
At this point it should be noted that while Rule 41(b)
of the Federal Rules provides that a warrant may be
issued to search for and seize any property constituting
evidence of a criminal offense in violation of the laws of
the United States, one important limitation has been
set forth in several recent cases. In VonderAhe v.
Howland, 13 Crim. L.R. 2096 (May 2, 1973), the ninth
circuit, relying on Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616
(1886), held that the massive seizure by the Internal
Revefnue Service of business and personal records during
the execution of a search warrant in connection with a
tax investigation for their possible communicative
and testimonial content violated the self-incrimination
privilege of their possessors. See also Hill v. Philpott,
445 F.2d 144, 149 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
991 (1971). Contra, United States v. Blank, 459 F.2d
383, 385 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887
(1972), where worksheets of a sport and horse-book
betting business were held not subject to suppression
on fifth amendment grounds, even though in the de-
fendant's handwriting, since they were not personal
communications but rather business acounts rendered
extraordinary only by the fact that the business was
itself illegal. It might be argued that Blank can be
distinguished from VonderAhe in that the items seized
in Blank could be considered seized for their corporeal
value as physical items manifesting the criminal offense
itself rather than for their communicative value and
content with reference to past criminal conduct.9 See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175
(1949). See also United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S.
102, 108 (1965), in which Mr. Justice Goldberg, after
reviewing the Court's prior holdings under the fourth
amendment, stated:
These decisions reflect the recognition that the
Fourth Amendment commands, like all constitu-
tional requirements, are practical and not abstact.
If the teachings of the Court's cases are to be fol-
lowed and the constitutional policy served, affi-
davits for search warrants, such as the one involved
here, must be tested and interpreted by magistrates
and courts in a commonsense and realistic fashion.
They are normally drafted by nonlawyers in the
midst and haste of criminal investigation. Tech-
nical requirements of elaborate specificity once
exacted under common law pleadings have no
proper place in this area. A grudging or negative
attitude by reviewing courts toward warrants
will tend to discourage police officers from sub-
mitting their evidence to a judicial officer before
acting.
that the afflant must support any suspicions and
beliefs he might have with adequate supporting
facts from which the magistrate can make an
independent judgment about probable cause. In
Nathanson v. United States0 the Court enunciated
the appropriate rule:
Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer may not
properly issue a warrant to search a private dwell-
ing unless he can find probable cause therefore from
facts or circumstances presented to him under oath
or affirmation. Mere affirmance of belief or suspi-
cion is not enough.U
If the affiant is seeking a search warrant on the
basis of information provided by an informant, he
must supply the magistrate with details sufficient
to credit this hearsay testimony. In Aguilar v.
Texas" the Supreme Court held that an affiant
must inform the magistrate of (1) the underlying
circumstances from which the informant concluded
that illegal activities were occurring, (2) the cir-
cumstances which lead him to believe that his
informant was reliable.
13
DETAL REQuED IN AN A=FAVIT: THE
FnsT PRONG oF AGuIAR
In evaluating an affidavit a magistrate must
first determine how the affiant or his informant
acquired his information. The matter is quite
simple when the affiant asserts that he or his
informant actually saw the criminal activity.
Where personal observations of a crime occur, the
first prong of Aguilar is met and the issue is re-
duced to whether the informant is credible.
14
While probable cause can be established even
though the informant did not observe the illegal
activity, the information must be sufficiently de-
tailed for the magistrate to draw an inference of
personal knowledge; otherwise the informant's tip
may be merely rumor or gossip.j 5 If there is no
10 290 U.S. 41 (1938).
1 Id. at 47.
378 U.S. 108 (1964).
13 Id. at 113.
24 See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573,
579 (1971); United States v. Suarez, 380 F.2d 713
(2d Cir. 1967); Coyne v. Watson, 282 F. Supp. 235
(S.D. Ohio 1967).
i5 Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 417 (1969).
A problem does arise when the informant Is basing his
assertions on hearsay information. Thus, where an
affiant's source relates that friends and associates of
principals involved in an interstate gambling operation
have furnished him with information concerning the
principal's operation, it has been held that this fails
to meet the Aguilar requirements, since the real issue
is the credibility of the so-called friends and associates,
1973]
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indication in the affidavit as to how the informant
received his information, a search warrant should
not be issued, unless other facts within the affidavit
support a finding of probable cause.
Should the affidavit state that the informant has
"personal knowledge" of criminal activities, the
magistrate should require the affiant to indicate
dearly how the informant obtained his first-hand
information. In United States v. Lynwood Long
16
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
held a search warrant invalid in an interstate
gambling case because the affiants merely stated
that the informants had "personal knowledge" of
gambling activities. The court concluded that
even though the tip was based on what the affidavit
called personal knowledge:
[T]his is only a conclusion, however, and standing
alone, it does not cure the lack of specificity in-
herent in the affidavit. There is no indication of
the source of the informant's 'personal knowledge',
nor are their tips sufficiently detailed to allow
a magistrate to infer that the informant had
gained information in a reliable way.
17
A somewhat related problem arises when an
affiant makes a statement in the form of a factual
assertion, which is in effect a conclusion of the
affiant. For example, in Berger v. Commonwealth'
s
and the circumstances under which they obtained
their information. See United States v. DeCesaro,
349 F. Supp. 549, 550 (E.D. Wis. 1972). Indeed, there
has been some questioning of the use of double hearsay
even when the affiant's source is another law enforce-
ment agent. Taking the position that double hearsay
is not to be encouraged, the second circuit recently
commented:
Where an informant speaks to an agent, it is that
agent who should normally relay that information
to the magistrate evaluating the search warrant
application. Informants' tips relayed through
two agents and then to the magistrate, however
accurately reported, unnecessarily reduce the
magistrates ability to make an independent de-
termination of the information's reliability.
United States v. Fiorella, 468 F.2d 688, 692 (2d Cir.
1972). However, when the information originates from
named citizens who are eyewitnesses or have other
direct knowledge, such as statements or admissions by
a suspect, and the affiant relates the collective informa-
tion received through other law enforcement agents'
interviews with these witnesses, it has been held that
the double hearsay does not preclude a finding of
probable cause. See United States v. McCoy, 478 F.2d
176 (10th Cir. 1973). Apparently, the ultimate test is
whether the information, taken in light of the totality
of the circumstances, can reasonably be said to be
reliable. These two cases also suggest a distinction
between information originating from confidential
police informants and private citizens. See note 51 infra.
16 439 F.2d 628 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
17 Id. at 630.
- 213 Va. 54, 189 S.E.2d 360 (1972).
law enforcement officials sought a search warrant
based on an affidavit which alleged that after
observing a rural farm house for over two months
they "further observed persons in the tent smoking
a substance which required use of a great number
of matches to remain lighted and the substance
being smoke appeared to be used in such a manner
as that of Cannabis Sativa L .... "19 The Virginia
supreme court held that this statement lacked
those details which would enable the magistrate
to determine for himself what was actually being
smoked. The court concluded: "The number of
matches used is insignificant without the detection
of an odor or description of some observed method
of use peculiar to the smoking of marijuana." 
20
Although an affiant does not have to name his
informant in the affidavit,2' in some cases an
affiant may bereluctant toprovide any information
which might reveal the identity of his informant,
and possibly endanger his life. As described by
one court:
... [O]fficer-affiants should be encouraged to fur-
nish to the magistrate as specific 'underlying cir-
cumstances' as possible.... We realize the reluc-
tancy of officer-afflants from being more specific
than absolutely necessary for fear of giving away
the identity of the informer which for one reason
or another they may feel the need to protect.
Unless there is a real necessity for doing so they
may well compound the problems of the probable
cause assessing magistrate, the trial court and this
court.22
Since the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
do not specifically require that affidavits be at-
tached to federal search warrants, nor that the
19 Id. at 361.
20Id.
2 United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108
(1965); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114 (1964);
Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528, 533 (1963);
Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271-72 (1960).
Some federal courts have applied the same rule of
nondisclosure in both warrant and nonwarrant cases.
See Smith v. United States, 358 F.2d 833 (D.C. Cir.
1966); Jones v. United States, 326 F.2d 124 (9th Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 956 (1964); United States
v. One 1957 Ford Ranchero Pickup, 265 F.2d 21 (10th
Cir. 1959). Other federal courts have distinguished
these two classes of cases and have required the identifi-
cation in nonwarrant cases. See United States v.
Robinson, 325 F.2d 391 (2d Cir. 1963); Cochran v.
United States, 291 F.2d 633 (8th Cir. 1961). See also
McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967), where the
Supreme Court held that an informant's identity need
not be disclosed at a preliminary hearing to determine
the sufficiency of an arrest or search.




search warrant contain the facts recited in the
affidavit which establish probable cause,2' an ap-
propriate solution to this problem is the use of a
"supplemental affidavit," separate from the pri-
mary affidavit, setting forth all the available
information. This special affidavit can then be
sealed and preserved for review should any claim
arise that the warrant was improperly issued."
A similar problem arises when the government
claims that it cannot reveal certain facts in an
affidavit because it does not want to compromise
classified information. In United States v. United
States District Court for the Eastern District of
n The relevent subsections of Rule 41 provide:
(c) A warrant shall issue only on an affidavit or
affidavits sworn to before the federal magistrate
or state judge and establishing the grounds for
issuing the warrant. If the federal magistrate or
state judge is satisfied that grounds for application
exist or that there is probable cause to believe that
they exist, he shall issue a warrant identifying the
property and naming or describing the person or
place to be searched. The finding of probable cause
may be based upon hearsay evidence in whole or
in part. Before ruling on a request for a warrant
the federal magistrate or state judge may require
the afflant to appear personally and may examine
under oath the affiant and any witness he may
produce, provided that such proceedings shall be
taken down by a court reporter or recording equip-
ment and made part of the affidavit. The warrant
shall be directed to a civil officer of the United
States authorized to enforce or assist in enforcing
any law thereof or to a person so authorized by
the President of the United States. It shall com-
mand the officer to search, within a specified period
of time not to exceed 10 days, the person or place
named for the property specified. ...
(d) The officer taking property under the warrant
shall give to the person from whom or from whose
premises the property was taken a copy of the
warrant and a receipt for property taken or shall
leave the copy and receipt at a place from which
the property was taken....
Fx. R. Cmal. P. 41(c), (d).
In Ledbetter v. United States, 211 F.2d 628 (D.C.
Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 977 (1954), the de-
fendant, convicted of violating the District of Colum-
bin's lottery law, argued that the execution of the
search warrant was invalid because no copy of the
affidavit was attached to the copy of the warrant served
upon him. The defendant contended that since the
offense was a crime under the D.C. code, a copy of
the affidavit pursuant to the D.C. code had to be
attached. The warrant, however, was issued by the
United States Commissioner upon application of a
United States marshall. The court held that the D.C.
code provision was inapplicable and that the federal
officiais had complied with the federal requirements
under rule 41 (c).
24 There are some practical reasons for attaching
affidavits to search warrants prior to execution. First,
it furnishes the accused with the reasons for the in-
trusion on his privacy. Second, it avoids any possible
claim that the affidavit later located in the official file
was in fact inserted after the search. Thus, whenever
possible magistrates should attach all affidavits to the
Michigan," Mr. Justice Powell answered this
contention by stating:
Nor do we believe prior judicial approval will frac-
ture the secrecy essential to official intelligence
gathering... Moreover, a warrant application
involves no public or adversary proceeding: It is
an ex park request before a magistrate or judge.
Whatever security dangers clerical and secretarial
personnel may pose can be minimized by proper
administrative measures, possibly to the point of
allowing the Government itself to provide the
necessary clerical assistance. 6
In addition to the measures suggested by Mr.
Justice Powell, the magistrate can utilize the
supplemental affidavit to serve as a record of his
reasons for issuing the search warrant.
In connection with the factual assertions re-
quired in an affidavit, an affiant will frequently
lapse into the passive voice in setting forth in-
formation, after initially stating that he had inter-
viewed an informant. Although the implication
might be that the informant supplied the informa-
tion, the affiant may be setting forth facts unre-
lated to his conversation with the informant.
For example, in United States v. Ndso a motel
clerk had observed burglary tools, money, guns
and a cutting torch in one of his rooms. Later,
information concerning blank postal money orders
and a Bank Americard was obtained through two
warrantless entries by police officers into the
same room. In applying for a search warrant, the
police commingled the results of the two entries.
Judge Miller, concurring in finding the search
warrant invalid, stated his belief that the officer
involved was not satisfied that the information
supplied him by the room clerk would support a
warrant and, therefore, used the information
gathered in both entries in hopes of establishing
probable cause. To avoid the situation described
by Judge Miller, magistrates should be skeptical
of affidavits which begin with such phrases as
"investigation disclosed," "it was learned that,"
"information received disclosed," or "observations
made disclosed," since they do not indicate the
source of the information or the reliability or trust-
worthiness of that source.29
search warrant. See eg. Moore v. United States, 461
F.2d 1236 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
25 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
26 Id. at 320-21.
- 459 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1972).
28Id. at 895.2 9 Federal magistrates must also guard against the
possibility that information in an affidavit may have
19731
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Another problem facing the magistrate in
evaluating the factual assertions in an affidavit
is the determination of whether the information
is currently accurate. In United States v. Harris0
the Supreme Court held that an informant's re-
port that he had purchased whiskey within the
past two weeks was sufficiently current, especially
since these purchases were part of a history of
purchases over a two year period.31 Mr. justice
Harlan, in his dissenting opinion, also rejected the
contention that the information was too stale,
observing that, "the totality of the tip reveals that
the informer purported to describe an on-going
operation which he had claimed he had personally
observed over the course of two years." 32
Although the permissible lapse of time between
the finding of the evidence and the application
for the search warrant will vary with each case,33
the facts submitted to the magistrate should
specify the time at which the evidence was gath-
ered,u and must convince him that the property
which is the object of the search is probably on
the person or the premises to be searched at the
been obtained in an illegal manner. If such information
constitutes a material part of the affidavit, the search
warrant is invalid, and what is seized pursuant to the
warrant will be suppressed. See United States v. Nelson,
459 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1972); United States v. Rosen-
berg, 416 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1969). However, where
the untainted information in an affidavit is sufficient,
the fact that other information in the affidavit was
obtained as a result of illegal means will not invalidate
the search. See James v. United States, 418 F.2d 1150
(D.C. Cir. 1969); Chin Kay v. United States, 311 F.2d
317 (9th Cir. 1962). A search warrant will not be
invalidated even though predicated upon information
obtained through entrapment. See Harness v. Ken-
tucky, 475 S.W.2d 485 (Ky. Ct. App.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 844 (1972).
30 403 U.S. 573 (1971).
31 Id. at 579 n. 1.
3 Id. at 589.32In Schoeneman v. United States, 317 F.2d 173,
177 (D.C. Cir. 1963), the court observed that "the
Government could cite, and we could find, no case
which sustained a search warrant issued more than 30
days after finding of the evidence which constituted
the basis of the search." In Schoenernan the court held a
107 day delay invalid. See also Dandrea v. United
States, 7 F.2d 861 (8th Cir. 1925) (42 days-invalid);
United States v. Sawyer, 213 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Penn.
1963) (107 days-invalid); United States v. Long,
169 F. Supp. 730 (D. D.C. 1959) (11 days-valid);
United States v. Allen, 147 F. Supp. 955 (E.D. Ky.
1957) (16 days-valid).
4The failure to include within an affidavit the time
the affiant received his information will normally
invalidate a search warrant. See Rosencranz v. United
States, 356 F.2d 310 (1st Cir. 1966); United States v.
Bosch, F. Supp. 15 (E.D. Mich. 1962). But see Rider v.
United States, 355 F.2d 192 (5th Cir. 1966), where the
court held that narration in the present tense was
sufficient to conclude that the information was current.
time the warrant is issued.35 Federal magistrates
will have to consider the totality of the circum-
stances surrounding the requested search such as
the nature of the items to be seized, the type of
criminal activity involved, and the nature of the
premises to be searched.
ESTABLISHING AN INFoRANT's RELIABILITY:
Ti SECOND PRONG OF AGUIIAR
The second prong of Aguilar requires that an
affiant set forth information in the affidavit which
will allow the magistrate to make an independent
judgment about the informant's reliability. The
magistrate cannot rely solely on the affiant's asser-
tion that his informant is trustworthy, truthful,
prudent, reliable or credible.
The informant's trustworthiness can be estab-
lished in two ways. First, an affiant can set forth
in the affidavit an informant's record of past
performance, which might indicate that he has
provided information in the past which has lead
to the seizure of illegal materials or resulted in
the arrest of persons who were later convicted 3 6
Second, an informant's trustworthiness can be
established through independent corroboration of
the informant's claims by law enforcement in-
vestigation or surveillance activities.Y
The United States Supreme Court has elaborated
on these methods for crediting an informant's tip.
In Spinelli v. United Statesa the Court discussed
the proper guidelines for evaluating an affidavit
which contains among other things an informant's
tip, corroborating evidence of matters contained
within the tip, and information unrelated to the
tip itself compiled by independent law enforce-
ment investigation. 9 According to the Court, the
1 See PROCEDURS MANUAL FOR UmTED STATES
MAGIsTRATEs 7-3 and 7-4 (1972):
A showing to the effect that the property to be
seized was at the place to be searched a substantial
time before the application is made does not justify
the issuance of a search warrant, for the reason
that during the intervening period the property
may have been moved away. The facts must show
that the property to be seized was known to be at
the place to be searched so recently as to justify
the belief that the property is still there at the time
of the issuance of the search warrant. It is advisable
to indicate the time of issuance upon the warrant.
"1See, e.g., United States v. Dunnings, 425 F.2d
836 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1002 (1970);
United States v. Stallings, 413 F.2d 200 (7th Cir.
1969).
17See, e.g., United States v. Roman, 451 F.2d 579
(4th Cir. 1971), Schulgz v. United States, 432 F.2d 25
(10th Cir. 1970).
38393 U.S. 410 (1969).




proper method is to look first at the informant's tip
and the affiant's assertions about the reliability of
his informant to see if they alone establish a reliable
factual basis from which the magistrate can make
an independent judgment about probable cause.4"
If the reliability of the tip is not established
through this procedure, the magistrate must then
look at the corroborating evidence to see if it
credits the tip.4 If the magistrate decides that
the tip cannot be credited in either of these two
ways, the magistrate must then look to other
parts of the affidavit to determine if the informa-
tion compiled by independent police investigation
sufficiently establishes probable cause.42
More recently, in United States v. Harris,4' Chief
Justice Burger, speaking for a plurality of the
Court,44 indicated that a magistrate should not
evaluate an affidavit in a highly technical manner
in order to determine whether an informant's tip is
reliable.4 According to the Chief Justice, the affi-
davit must be considered as a whole to determine
(1) The FBI had kept track of Spinelli's move-
ments on five days during the month of August
1965. On four of these occasions, Spinelli was seen
crossing one of two bridges leading from Illinois
into St. Louis, Missouri. On four of the five days,
Spinelli was also seen parking his car in a lot used
by residents of an apartment in St. Louis. On one
day, Spinelli was seen to enter a particular apart-
ment in the building.
(2) An FBI check with the telephone company
revealed that this apartment had two listed phones.
(3) Spinelli was known to agents as a bookmaker,
an associate of bookmakers, a gambler, and an
associate of gamblers.
(4) The FBI has been informed by a confidential
reliable informant that Spineli is operating a






"403 U.S. 573 (1971).
4Chief Justice Burger's opinion was divided into
three parts. Part I held there was sufficient informa-
tion in the affidavit to find the informant reliable.
Part II criticized the ruling in Spinelli as being too
technical. In Part ]I the Court held that a declara-
tion against penal interest was sufficient to credit the
informant's tip. Justices Black and Blackmun con-
curred in all three parts. Justice Stewart concurred in
Part I and Justice White concurred in Part III. Justices
Harlan, Brennan, Douglas and Marshall dissented.
41 In Harris the affidavit alleged:
(1) The accused had been known as a trafficker in
whiskey.
(2) Another officer had seized whiskey on the
premises before.
(3) An unnamed person, fearing for his life, re-
vealed that he had purchased whiskey from the
accused within the past two weeks.
(4) The affiant found this person to be prudent.
Id. at 575-76.
whether there is a "substantial basis" for crediting
an informant's tip.46 The Court also indicated that
a declaration against penal interest by the in-
formant would meet the requirement of the
second prong of Aguilar."
Although the decision in Harris appears to give
the magistrate broad discretion in determining
the reliability of the informant," federal magis-
trates should nevertheless insure that facts con-
tained within an affidavit, whether of the in-
formant's past record or of corroborating evidence
of the informant's claims, establish a sufficient
basis for crediting a tip. Both Chief Justice Burger
and Mr. Justice Harlan, who wrote the dissent in
Harris, agreed that a bare statement by an affiant
that he believed the informant to be truthful
without any supporting evidence would not pro-
vide a basis for crediting the report of an unnamed
informant.
49
In some cases law enforcement officials may
indicate in an affidavit that the information was
provided by a citizen-informant. Unlike police
informants, who often receive some consideration
for their information, the citizen-informant may
have less reason to make statements which are
self-serving.50 Consequently, there may be more
justification for crediting their tips. Nevertheless,
the magistrate should require the affiant to indi-
cate the demeanor, age, occupation, reputation,
any arrest or conviction record, or any employment
record of his citizen-informant as well as the under-
lying circumstances surrounding the citizen-
informant's knowledge of the alleged illegal
activities.51 While the absence of such information
16 The "substantial basis" test was first enunciated
by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Jones v. United States,
362 U.S. 257, 272 (1960):
We have decided that, as hearsay alone does not
render an affidavit insufficient the Commissioner
need not have required the informants or their
affidavits to be produced, or that Didone have
personally made inquiries about the apartment,
so long as there was a substantial basis for crediting
the hearsay.
", 403 U.S. at 583.
48 See e g United States v. Unger, 469 F.2d 1283
(7th Cir 1972); United States v. Guinn, 454 F.2d 29
(5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Roman, 451 F.2d
579 (4th Cir. 1971); United States ex rd. DiRienzo v.
Yeager, 443 F.2d 228 (3rd Cir. 1971).
,9 Id. at 578, 590-91.
50 See United States v. Unger, 469 F.2d 1283, 1287
N.Y. (7th Cir. 1972); People v. Hoffman, 45 Ill.2d 221,
258 N.E.2d 836 (1970); State v. Paszek, 50 Wis.2d
619, 189 N.W.2d 836 (1971).
61 See Adair v. State, 482 S.W.2d 247, 250 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1972), in which the Texas court noted the




may not be fatal, it will enable the magistrate to
determine that the affiant is in fact dealing with a
citizen-informant, and also help him make a more
precise judgment about the reliability of this
particular citizen-informant.n
TRuiHuuEss OF FACTS CONTAINED
WITmN THE AFFIDAVIT
Although the sufficiency of the factual assertions
supporting the issuance of a search warrant is
dearly open to attack, the law is somewhat un-
settled as to whether the truthfulness of facts set
out in an affidavit can also be challenged at a
hearing to suppress evidence. The position that
the substance of the assertions within an affidavit
cannot be attacked was very recently set forth
by the New Jersey supreme court:n
In our view the constitutional safeguards are met
when the impartial judge finds the affidavit for
the warrant credible and legally sufficient. Com-
pliance with the requirement for an oath by the
officer must be regarded as a procedurally ade-
quate manifestation of his veracity. That oath
followed by the judge's determination that the facts
vouched for show probable cause are all the Consti-
tution demand and guarantee to our citizens. If the
police officers lie, the truth of the accused's alleged
criminal activities as revealed by the evidence
seized under the warrant will not be diluted. In
that event.., the accused will have to meet noth-
ing more nor worse than the 'truth' at plenary
trial.... Further, so far as the untruthful officers
are concerned, they expose themselves to the
The police are often confronted with the first time
informer sometimes referred to as a 'walk in' who
is unknown to the police and with whom the police
have had no previous experience. When they give
information as to criminal activity their informa-
tion should not become unusuable because there
has not been a previous instance of reliability.
When citizens are involved it cannot be expected
that they would have past transactions or dealings
with the police. And while in many cases less reason
may exist for failing to disclose the informer's
identity to the magistrate than where the ordinary
police informer is involved, nevertheless, many
citizens prefer to cooperate in ananymity with the
police or fear possible retribution by the accused.
Certainly where sufficient 'underlying circum-
stances' are presented to the magistrate so he can
make an independent determination as to the
credibility of the informer, the use of such in-
formers is not to be excluded.
See also United States v. Brooks, 350 F. Supp. 1152
(E.D. Wis. 1972).
2 Some of the underlying circumstances will also
help the magistrate to determine whether the present
information is reliable. See Harris v. United States,
403 U.S. at 582.
11 State v. Petillo, 61 N.J. 165, 293 A.2d 649 (1972).
sanction of indictment for perjury or false swear-
ing, a charge of criminal contempt, and assessment
of monetary damages in a civil action."
While the United States Supreme Court has
not dearly decided the issue, 5 the Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit has acknowledged
that under certain circumstances a defendant
can challenge the substance of assertions in an
affidavit. 5 In United States v. Dunningsn the
court indicated that upon a proper preliminary
showing by a defendant of falsehood or imposition
on a magistrate, a district judge can conduct a
hearing to determine whether these claims are
justified." In this context, the court went on to
place the responsibility of insuring that the in-
formation is accurate on the magistrate reviewing
the affidavit:
The interposition of an independent judicial officer
whose decision, not that of the police, [will] govern
whether liberty or privacy is to be invaded.. . goes
a long way toward accomplishing the objectives of
the Fourth Amendment. True, the objectives are
not accomplished if the judicial officer is put upon
by the police. But it is the responsibility of such
officers, particularly in light of their new dignity as
United States magistrates and the requirements for
their membership in the bar and periodic train-
ing ... to see to it that they are not deceived."5
Prior to the issuance of a search warrant, there
are several methods available to a magistrate to
11 Id. at 174, 293 A.2d at 653-54. See also Kenney v.
United States, 157 F.2d 442 (D.C. Cir. 1946); United
States v. Burnett, 53 F.2d 219 (W.D. Mo. 1931); State
v. Anselmo, 260 La. 306, 256 So.2d 98 (1971), cert.
denied, 407 U.S. 911 (1972).
55 In Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 501
(1925), Chief Justice Taft stated in dicta:
If the grounds on which the warrant was issued be
controverted, the judge.., must proceed to take
testimony in relation thereto, .... If it appears
... that there is no probable cause for believing
the existence of the grounds on which the warrant
was issued ... must cause the property to be re-
stored to the person from whom it was taken.
56 The Fourth Circuit had previously taken a similar
position. See King v. United States, 282 F.2d 398 (4th
Cir. 1960), in which the court indicated that a search
warrant could be challenged on such grounds, and that
false facts given by an affiant could vitiate a warrant
and a subsequent search. See also Theodor v. Superior
Court, 104 Cal. Rptr. 226, 501 P.2d 234 (1972), where
the California supreme court held that under the Cali-
fornia Penal Code a defendant may on a motion to
suppress challenge the factual accuracy of statements in
an affidavit.
-425 F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1969).




reduce the possibility that the warrant will be
issued on the basis of false assertions in the affida-
vits. First, the magistrate can analyze the affidavit
for internal consistency. If there are reasonable
grounds to question some of the factual representa-
tions, he should question the affiant under oath,60
and include this testimony in the affidavit, or
perhaps in a supplemental affidavit if appropriate."
If the magistrate has suspicions about assertions
made by an informant to the affiant, he might re-
quire that the informant be produced for further
questioning under oath. If these procedures do not
resolve the questions the magistrate might have
concerning the veracity of the affiant, the magis-
trate should warn the affiant about the conse-
quences of perjury or contempt of court, as well
as possible liability for civil damages."2 As a last
resort, the magistrate can, of course, refuse to
issue the search warrant.
NIGHTTIMm SEARCH WAa-ANTS
Although there has been strong reluctance in
the past to allow nighttime searches," recent
changes in federal law have abandoned the "posi-
tivity" standard," and substituted a standard
which requires that the affiant show that "reason-
able cause" exists for the execution of a warrant
at night. Rule 41 (c) of the Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure now provides in part:
60 Rule 41(c) of the federal rules provides in part:
Before ruling on a request for a warrant the federal
magistrate or state judge may require the afflant
to appear personally and may examine under oath
the affiant and any witness he may produce, pro-
vided that such proceeding shall be taken down
by a court reporter or recording equipment and
made part of the affidavit.
FED. R.Cmnr P. 41(c).
61 See note 23, supra.
6In Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents, 402 U.S. 388
(1971), the Supreme Court held that a law enforcement
official may be liable for civil damages for an illegal
search and seizure.
eSee Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 210 (1960),
where Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated:
Searches of the dwelling house were the special
object of this universal condemnation of official
intrusion. Night-time search was the evil in its
most obnoxious form.
See also Frank v. State of Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 366
(1959); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 498
(1958); Distefano v. United States, 58 F.2d 963 (5th
Cir. 1932).
"The prior standard under Rule 41(c) provided:
The warrant shall direct that it be served in the
daytime, but if the affidavits are positive that the
property is on the person or in the place to be
searched, the warrant may direct that it may be
served at any time.
FmD. R. Cpum. P. 41(c) (1966).
The warrant shall be served in the daytime, unless
the issuing authority, by appropriate provision in
the warrant, and for reasonable cause shown,
authorizes its execution at times other than day-
time."
Significantly, Congress has also abandoned the
positivity rule in enacting the "District of Colum-
bia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of
1970." The D.C. code sets forth the following
grounds for permitting the execution of a search
warrant during nighttime:
The application may also contain- (1) a request
that the search warrent be made executable at any
hour of the day or night, upon the ground that
there is probable cause to believe that (A) it cannot
be executed during the hours of daylight, (B) the
property sought is likely to be removed or de-
stroyed if not seized forthwith, or (C) the property
sought is not likely to be found except at certain
times or in certain circumstances.66
While the provisions within the new federal
rule do not provide clear-cut standards for deter-
mining when a nighttime warrant would be ap-
propriate, the provisions within the D.C. code
suggest workable guidelines which are consistent
with the federal rule. Under the D.C. code, for
example, a nighttime warrant would be justified
if a narcotics dealer maintained 'qookouts" during
the day to warn of police approach, and a police-
affiant claimed that he needed the "cloak of dark-
ness" to enter the premises before the narcotics
were destroyed."
It should also be noted that the federal rules
now define "daytime" to mean the hours between
6:00 A.M. and 10:00 P.M.' s This definition reflects
the increasing urbanization of our society in
which most persons infrequently retire for the
night prior to 10:00 P.M. and usually arise some-
time around 6:00 A.M. It also reflects a judgment
concerning law enforcement needs in coping with
an ever-increasing volume of crimes associated
with our population shift. The choice appears to
strike a reasonable balance between the needs of
law enforcement and the right of special privacy
65F=. R. Cmum. P. 41(c) was amended April 24,
1972, eff. October 1, 1972.
66 D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-522 (1970).
67For state court rulings under a reasonable grounds
standard much like the new federal rule, see People v.
Aguilar, 240 Cal. App. 2d 502, 49 Cal. Rptr. 584
(1966)- Galena v. Municipal Court, 237 Cal. App. 2d
581, 47 Cal. Rptr. 88 (1965); People v. Watson, 39
Misc. 2d 808, 241 N.Y.S.2d 934 (1963).
"FED. R. Cpm. P. 41(h), effective October 1, 1972.
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during those hours of repose, rest and sleep, in
which an intrusion should only be justified by
exceptional circumstances. With this expansion
of the hours for daytime warrants, nighttime
warrants should only be issued upon a proper
showing that execution must be made between
the hours of 10:00 P.M. and 6:00 A.M. 69
SpEcimIcrTy or AREA TO BE SEARCHED
Under the Fourth Amendment a search warrant
must describe the place to be searched with par-
ticularity. Generally, a search warrant sufficiently
describes the place if "the officer with a search
warrant can with reasonable effort ascertain and
identify the place intended." 70 A single warrant
69 It should be noted that applications for narcotics
violations are now covered by 21. U.S.C. § 879 (1970),
a provision of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Pre-
vention and control Act of 1970, which provides:
A search warrant relating to offenses involving
controlled substances may be served at any time
of the day or night if the judge or United States
Magistrate is satisfied that there is probable cause
to believe that grounds exist for the warrant and
for its service at such time.
See United States v. Gooding, 477 F.2d 428 (D.C. Cir.
1973), where Judge Wilkey in the lead opinion con-
cluded that Section 879(a) was merely a re-enactment
of 18 U.S.C. § 1405(1) requiring only a showing of
probable cause to search for all substances controlled
by the 1970 Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention
and Control Act, regardless of whether the warrant was
to be executed in the daytime or at night. While Judge
Fahey concurred that Section 879(a) was merely a re-
enactment of Section 1405(1), he intimates that the
amendment to Rule 41(c) requiring "reasonable cause"
for a nighttime search might be considered as requiring
some additional showing for a nighttime warrant, not-
ing that no significant burden would be imposed on the
magistrate or other officials by requiring special reasons
for a search at night even for narcotics. However, he
does not formally adopt this position at this time,
stating:
The salutary effect of the modification of subpara-
graph (c) of the Rule remains for consideration with
respect to search warrants issued after its effective
date.
Id. at 439. Judge Robinson, concurring in the result,
concludes that Section 879(a) is not merely a re-enact-
ment of Section 1405(1). According to judge Robinson,
the language ("and for its service at such time") re-
quires something more than simple probable cause. He
reasons that Section 879(a) now requires a showing of
probable cause for the service of the search warrant at
night and that an on-going drug-selling operation is
sufficient for this purpose. He concludes:
[W]here... a search is calculated not only to
garner evidence of past crime but also to terminate
a serious species of ongoing criminality, rea-
sonable cause for a nocturnal intrusion is demon-
strated.
Id. at 444. See also United States v. Thomas, 294 A.2d
164 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
70 Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 503 (1925).
See United States v. DePugh, 452 F.2d 915 (10th Cir.
cannot describe an entire building when cause is
shown for searching only one apartment therein.7I
Nor can a warrant, describing a business premises
on the first floor, be executed to include an apart-
ment on the second floor which is separate and
distinct, even though under the control of the same
person.72
A warrant has been sustained where it specified
a premises at a given address, even though there
were two separate apartments at that address,
where the warrant itself went on to limit its scope
to the premises occupied by a named individual
and over which he had possession and control.
7 3
The New Jersey supreme court recently held that
even though a warrant failed to indicate by num-
ber which of three apartments on the floor of an
apartment building was intended, but did indicate
that the apartment was the one occupied by the
defendant, and, in fact, the defendant's apartment
had no number on the door, the description of the
premises was adequate and the search warrant
was sufficient.74
When law enforcement agents prior to executing
a search warrant have no notice of internal altera-
tions in a house with attic and basement apart-
ments, a search of the entire premises pursuant
to the warrant has been held proper in Santore v.
United States.75 In Santore the court stated that it
was too late, consistent with the mission of law
enforcement officials, to retreat to obtain a new
warrant.76 However, when law enforcement officials
have prior notice of possible dual occupancy of a
premises, they cannot properly seek a warrant for
the entire premises but can only seek a warrant for
that portion of the premises within the possession
and under the control of the person whose alleged
criminal activities are the basis of the search
warrant.Y
These cases suggest that magistrates must
carefully scrutinize the efforts of police officials
in connection with the description of the premises
1971); United States v. Harmon, 317 F. Supp. 923
(D.C. Tenn. 1970).
71 United States v. Hinton, 219 F.2d 324 (7th Cir.
1955).
72 United States v. Kaye, 432 F.2d 647 (D.C. Cir.
1970).
73Kenney v. United States, 157 F.2d 442 (D.C.
Cir. 1946).
7 State v. Wright, 61 N.J. 146, 293 A.2d 380 (1972).
75 290 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1960).
76 Id. at 67.




to be searched. Should there be any question as
to the particularity of the premises arising out
of the description in the affidavit, the affiant
should be questioned in order to insure that the
search warrant, when issued, contains the proper
description.
ANTICIPATORY SEARcH WARRANTs
Federal magistrates have recently been con-
fronted with search warrant applications involving
controlled deliveries of marijuana, or tampered or
stolen mail, pursuant to the direction of customs
or postal officials in which the affiant requests the
magistrate to sign the warrant prior to actual
delivery. Two recent cases have upheld such war-
rants. In United States ex rel. Beal v. Skaff' the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held
such a warrant valid because it found that the
warrant could not have been executed until after
the contraband was delivered. In sustaining the
warrant, the court acknowledged that certain
difficulties arise in warrants of these types:
[A] warrant which antedates the commission of the
offense which is relied upon to support its issuance
might lack an essential element of judicial control:
the requirement that probable cause exist to believe
that execution will not precede the commission of
the crime or possession of the goods to be seizedY
9
The court concluded:
There was no danger that the property seized would
be other than that specified in the affidavit upon
which the warrant was issued.... Moreover, the
nature of the article to be seized [marijuana]-the
very real possibility that delay might have re-
sulted in its disposal or concealment-compelled
quick action by the magistrate. Confined to these
facts, we are of the opinion that the warrant and
its execution were constitutionally valid.
8'
The New York Court of Appeals has gone even
further in upholding such warrants. In People v.
Glen" the court sustained a warrant issued one
week prior to the time the affidavit indicated that
the contraband would be delivered. The court
took the position that in most cases possession
when a warrant is normally issued is only proba-
tive of the likelihood of future possession when
-8418 F.2d 430 (7th Cir. 1969).79Id. at 433.
80 Id. at 433-34.
8130 N.Y.S.2d 252, 282 N.E.2d 614 (1972).
the warrant is actually executed. It further ob-
served that even after a warrant is issued an officer
has some discretion in delaying execution, with
the result that at the time of execution the con-
traband may no longer be in the suspect's posses-
sion. Accordingly, the court concluded:
The ultimate answer to the problem is that as long
as the evidence creates substantial probability that
the seizable property will be on the premises when
searched, the warrant should be sustained. To be
sure, where there is no present possession the sup-
porting evidence for the prospective warrant must
be strong thatthe particular possessionofparticular
property will occur and that the elements to bring
about the possession are in process and will result
in the possession at the time and place specified.
Otherwise, the hated general writs of assistance of
Pre-Revolutionary times would be revived, in effect,
despite the constitutional limitations. Moreover,
the issuing Judge should be satisfied that there is
no likelihood that the warrant will be executed
prematurely.82
Notwithstanding this limited support for the
use of anticipatory search warrants,8 federal
magistrates should be very cautious in issuing
these warrants. When, with a minimum of in-
convenience, law enforcement officials can com-
municate by radio or telephone with a fellow
officer at the judicial official's residence, and the
warrant can be issued and executed shortly after
delivery of the items to be seized, the magistrate
should decline to issue such warrants in advance.
Another possible solution would be for the magis-
trate to include in the warrant itself language
restricting the execution of the warrant until law
enforcement officials have actually observed the
delivery. As an added safeguard, the magistrate
should also require execution within a specified
number of hours after delivery. 4
2 Id. at 259, 282 N.E.2d at 617.
8 But see State v. Ferrigno, 256 A.2d 795 (Conn.
Cir. Ct. 1969), which held that obtaining "advance"
search warrants which are executed at the time crimi-
nal activity is in progress is unconstitutional.
81A recent memorandum by the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts dated May 3, 1973
to all Federal Judges, United States Magistrates, and
District Court Clerks suggests that in connection with
Revised Rule 41(c) providing that all search warrants
must be executed within a specified period of time, not
exceeding ten days, the issuing magistrate should
specify on the search warrant the time period in which
the search must be executed endorsing on the warrant:
"The search, herein authorized, must be executed
within the period of _."
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CONCLUSION With this role in mind, it has been the purpose of
Because the law of search and seizure has be- this article to identify some of the pressing prob-
come increasingly complicated, the role of the lems confronting magistrates today. It is hoped
"neutral and detached" magistrate has never that the suggestions made throughout this article
been more critical for the protection of those will act as working rules to help the federal magis-
rights guaranteed by the fourth amendment. trate perform his function more effectively.
